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Defining Hate Speech
A Seemingly Elusive Task
Audrey Fino*
Abstract
This article looks at the international criminal law on hate speech that falls
short of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Using the most
egregious form of hate speech that has been prosecuted as an international
crime — that of direct and public incitement to genocide — as a baseline, the
author analyses the legal parameters of hate speech as persecution (a crime
against humanity) and hate speech as instigation (a mode of liability). In so
doing, the author critically reviews the International Residual Mechanism for
the International Criminal Tribunals’ (IRMCT) appeal judgment in the Šešelj
case (Šešelj Appeal Judgment) in the light of prior case law of the International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Criminal Tribunals
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY respectively). The
author submits that a plain reading of the Šešelj Appeal Judgment supports
the view that it is only the more extreme form of incitement to violence,
incitement to commit crimes, followed by actual violent acts, that may
constitute hate speech amounting to the crime of persecution: incitement to
discrimination or incitement to hatred as such do not qualify. Whether ‘in-
citement to violence’ absent the commission of crimes could qualify as perse-
cution (a crime against humanity) remains an unsettled point. With regard to
hate speech as instigation, the Šešelj Appeal Judgment’s restatement and ap-
plication of the law causes less controversy: the substantial causal connection
required for instigation was found to be direct in the circumstances of that case
— even though directness is not a legal requirement for instigation. The au-
thor concludes that both these interpretations of hate speech are consistent
with the earlier ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence and, more generally, with
international human rights law which, with some controversial exceptions,
* Audrey Fino is a consultant and lecturer in public international and international humanitarian
law at the University of Groningen and a visiting lecturer at the University of Malta. She is also a
PhD researcher on hate speech in international criminal and human rights law. She has worked
as Legal Officer with REDRESS, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and at the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The views expressed are those
of the author alone. [finaud8@gmail.com]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Journal of International Criminal Justice 18 (2020), 31–57 doi:10.1093/jicj/mqaa023
 The Author(s) (2020). Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse,






/jicj/article-abstract/18/1/31/5858150 by guest on 24 June 2020
allows criminalization only of the most extreme forms of incitement to
violence.
1. Introduction
With the rise in incidents of hate speech and hate crime around the world,
exacerbated by the rise of nationalist political discourse against ‘others’,
belonging to, for instance, a different colour, religion, nationality or ethnic
origin or descent, there is a corresponding interest in what hate speech actu-
ally is.1 Hate speech and hate crime are indicative of escalating internal strife
in society and can possibly constitute an early warning sign of mass violations
of human rights, crimes against humanity or even genocide.2 Criminalizing
hate speech is one tool in an array of measures that States can take to deter
crime in all situations, including during armed conflict.
However, there is a paucity of jurisprudence on hate speech before inter-
national criminal tribunals. Most of the case law has focused on direct and
public incitement to genocide, a crime first clearly spelled out in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention), and replicated into the statutes of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
grey area, and thus admittedly more interesting legal issues, however, arise
when hate speech is not so clear-cut, especially because it is neither direct nor
public. More recently, the International Residual Mechanism for the
International Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), the successor of both the ICTR
and ICTY, grabbing the media’s and scholars’ attention, rendered the Šešelj
appeal judgment (Šešelj Appeal Judgment) on such hate speech.3
1 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘hate speech’ is used to refer to incitement to violence
as incitement to commit crimes, falling short of direct and public incitement to commit geno-
cide. It does not cover ‘mere’ incitement to hatred or discrimination. On the issue, see e.g.
Combating Racist Hate Speech (CERD Recommendation No. 35), UN Doc. CERD/C/GC/35, 26
September 2013, at 46; ECRI General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech
(ECRI Recommendation No. 15), Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance, CR (2016)15, 8 December 2015, § 4. See also UN Secretary-General’s remarks at
the launch of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, 18 June 2019,
available online at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-06-18/secretary-gen
erals-remarks-the-launch-of-the-united-nations-strategy-and-plan-of-action-hate-speech-deliv
ered (visited 17 March 2020); Opening Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 41st session of the Human Rights Council, 24 June 2019, available online at
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID¼24724&LangID¼E
(visited 17 March 2020).
2 See Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, A Tool for Prevention, July 2014, at 18–24;
Decision on Follow-Up to the Declaration on Prevention of Genocide: Indicators of Patterns of
Systematic and Massive Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/67/1, 14 October 2005, §§ 8–9. See
also Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, A/HRC/39/64, 12
September 2018, §§ 73, 81, 85.
3 Judgment, Šešelj (MICT-16-99-A), Appeals Chamber, 11 April 2018 (Šešelj Appeal Judgment).
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This article attempts to address the question of what category of hate
speech, short of direct and public incitement to genocide, is criminal. Neither
the Šešelj Trial Judgment4 nor the Šešelj Appeal Judgment set out a clear
definition of hate speech. The only positive definition of hate speech thus
remains the one given by the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, which distin-
guished between direct and public incitement to commit genocide on the one
hand, and ‘hate speech in general (or inciting discrimination or violence)’ on
the other.5 This failure by international tribunals to clearly address some of the
basic questions that practitioners grapple with when prosecuting or defending
hate speech cases, has given rise to various interpretations of what types of
hate speech may be considered criminalized under international law. Some
scholars argue that in certain circumstances, hate speech is criminal even if
the words used do not call for violence.6 Others, on the other hand, acknowl-
edging that hate speech falling short of calls to violence is not criminalized,
opine that States should adopt a unified liability treaty on ‘atrocity speech
offences’.7 In their view, such a treaty would codify the new crimes of both
‘incitement to commit war crimes’ and ‘incitement to crimes against human-
ity’, which would include criminalizing hate speech which does not amount to
calls for violence but is nonetheless part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population.8
In this context of legal and judicial uncertainty, this article proposes to fill
the gap and thus addresses the — seemingly basic — questions that have yet
to be answered. First: is hate speech amounting to calls to hatred or discrim-
ination, but short of calls to violence, criminal — or does it have to call to
violence to constitute a crime? What is a ‘call to violence’? Does it include calls
to commit crimes or is a call to commit a crime the same as a call to violence?
In other words, has the jurisprudence used the terms ‘call to violence’ inter-
changeably with ‘call to commit crimes’? If a call to violence is a call to
commit a crime, does the latter have to be a certain category of crime, such
4 Judgment, Šešelj (ICTY-03-67-T), Trial Chamber, 31 March 2016 (Šešelj Trial Judgment).
5 Judgment, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (ICTR-99-52-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 November
2007 (Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment), § 692.
6 See e.g. W. Timmermann, ‘International Speech Crimes Following the Šešelj Judgment’, in
P. Dojčinović (ed.), Propaganda and International Criminal Law: From Cognition to Criminality
(Routledge, 2019), chap 4, at 115–116, 118; R. Wilson and M. Gillett, The Hartford
Guidelines on Speech Crimes in International Criminal Law (Peace and Justice Initiative, 2018),
at 144.
7 See G. Gordon, Atrocity Speech Law: Foundation, Fragmentation, Fruition (Oxford University Press,
2017), at 19–24, 316–321, 346–347, 349–356; 373–382, 403–404; G. Gordon, Reply by
Gregory S. Gordon: On the General Part, the New Media and the Responsibility to Protect, 14 July
2017, available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2017/07/14/reply-by-gregory-s-gordon-on-the-
general-part-the-new-media-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/ (visited 17 March 2020), at 1.
See also W. Timmerman, ‘Inciting Speech in the former Yugoslavia: The Šešelj Trial
Chamber Judgment’, 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2017) 133–155, at 154–
155; Timmerman, supra note 6, at 119.
8 Ibid.
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as crimes against the person?9 Secondly: does violence actually have to ensue
for hate speech to be criminalized? Put differently, is there a causal nexus
required between the hate speech and subsequent acts of violence, hatred,
or discrimination? Can hate speech amount to an inchoate crime, whereby
prosecutors would have no need to show causation between the hate speech
and any subsequent acts of violence, hatred, or discrimination?
To assist in this inquiry, the article will first briefly review the crime of direct
and public incitement to genocide, thus considering what hate speech is not.
This will serve as a baseline against which to analyse hate speech. By identify-
ing the legal test required for a conviction for the most egregious cases of direct
and public incitement to genocide, the author will be able to effectively discuss
the relatively less obvious cases of hate speech that are also prohibited under
international criminal law. The article does so through a practical assessment of
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT) and ICTR jurisprudence
in the light of the more recent Šešelj Appeal Judgment, rather than from a
theoretical perspective of whether hate speech is an inchoate crime or not.
The discussion will then turn to a critical analysis of the Šešelj Trial
Judgment and the Šešelj Appeal Judgment. Without delving into the various
controversies surrounding it, eloquently articulated by Judge Lattanzi in her
partially dissenting opinion,10 the Šešelj Trial Judgment presents us with a
unique opportunity to investigate what constitutes hate speech that is crim-
inal, including: (i) whether calls to violent action are required; (ii) what this
entails, e.g. calls to commit crimes; and (iii) the causal nexus required. This
will be done by outlining the legal elements of the crimes and modes of liability
for which Šešelj was convicted by the Appeals Chamber. The analysis of these
issues is glaringly missing in the Šešelj Trial Judgment and, while the Šešelj
Appeal Judgment sheds some light on certain aspects of this, the discussion is
still by no means comprehensive — something inherent in an appeal proced-
ure, which does not — and should not — entail a de novo review of the facts.11
Since the Šešelj Appeal Judgment primarily focused on hate speech as the
underlying act of persecution (a crime against humanity) and as a form of
instigation (a mode of liability) the discussion will revolve around the legal test
required for hate speech to qualify as persecution and as instigation of crimes,
such as persecution, deportation and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as
crimes against humanity, as well as murder, torture, cruel treatment and
plunder of public or private property as violations of the laws or customs of
war.12 The case will be made that a contextual reading of the jurisprudence
9 The jurisprudence is silent on this point. A discussion on what constitutes ‘calls to violence’ is
found below in the context of the discussion on incitement as the actus reus of persecution (a
crime against humanity).
10 See Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Flavia Lattanzi – Amended Version, Šešelj Trial
Judgment (Dissenting Opinion), Vol. 3.
11 See Šešelj Appeal Judgment, §§ 12, 14.
12 These were the crimes for which the prosecution requested the Appeals Chamber to convict
Šešelj. See Third Amended Indictment, Šešelj (Indictment) (IT-03-67), 7 December 2007, §§ 18,
20–22, 24–30, 34. The author will not address the chapeau requirements of crimes against
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shows that only hate speech that incites violence, in the form of inciting the
commission of crimes, is criminal under international criminal law, while in-
citement to discrimination or to hatred do not qualify. Furthermore, in the
context of hate speech as a crime of persecution, a crime against humanity,
and as a mode of liability of instigation of crimes, a causal connection between
such speech and the subsequent act of violence needs to be proven. The article
concludes that the criminalization of hate speech should not be expanded nor
broadly interpreted as this would go against both a holistic reading of the
jurisprudence and international human rights law.13 A look at human rights
law is instructive not only because the application and interpretation of inter-
national criminal law must be consistent with it, but also because it is also
facing similar challenges in defining hate speech, as will be noted below.14
2. The Most Egregious Form of Speech — Direct and
Public Incitement to Commit Genocide
As a starting point, we know what hate speech is not — it is not direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.15 It is therefore useful to delve into
what direct and public incitement to commit genocide is, so that we can
exclude it — by a process of elimination — when trying to define the contours
of hate speech.
As a statutory crime first set forth in the Genocide Convention, the elements
of the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide are easier to
ascertain, even in the light of the paucity of jurisprudence. This is because the
text of the Genocide Convention itself, and an assessment of its travaux pré-
paratoires, already explain the main purpose and object of the drafters. This is
also why it is helpful to use this crime as a baseline to discuss the legal
parameters of hate speech both as persecution (a crime against humanity)
and instigation (a mode of liability).
Looking at the plain language of the Genocide Convention, it is the most
extreme form of incitement that is criminalized — public and direct.16
The Genocide Convention also clearly excludes from its ambit hate speech
‘only’ inciting to racial discrimination or hatred, short of incitement to violence
which is not genocide.17 For instance, showing support for other persons’
humanity but will limit the analysis to the underlying act of hate speech and when and how
this may amount to persecution.
13 References are made to human rights law throughout but an in-depth analysis of hate speech
under international human rights law is beyond the scope of this article.
14 See Art. 21(3) ICCSt.
15 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 692.
16 Art. III(c) Genocide Convention.
17 See also D.F. Orentlicher, ‘Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v.
Nahimana’, 21 American University International Law Review (2006) 557–596, at 561, 563;
W. Schabas, ‘Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide’, 46 McGill Law Journal (2000)
141–171.
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speeches which incited genocide is not enough to constitute direct and public
incitement to genocide.18
ICTR jurisprudence on the elements of this crime is also pertinent in under-
standing its contours: the actus reus of direct and public incitement to commit
genocide requires that the accused directly and publicly incites the commission
of genocide;19 the mens rea required is the intent to directly prompt or provoke
(an)other individual(s) to commit genocide.20
With regard to what can constitute the direct element of incitement, the
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, upholding the trial chamber’s position,21
stressed that what is relevant is the meaning of the words used in the specific
context.22 If the discourse remains ambiguous, even when considered in its
context, it cannot constitute direct incitement to commit genocide.23 The ICTR
Appeals Chamber also required specifically urging another individual to take
immediate criminal action, rather than merely making a vague or indirect sug-
gestion.24 Being an inchoate offence, the crime of direct and public incitement
to commit genocide is punishable even where the incitement fails to produce
the result expected by the perpetrator, that is, even if no genocide actually
follows.25 Against this backdrop, the author will now turn to the early juris-
prudence on hate speech which does not amount to direct and public incite-
ment to commit genocide.
18 Judgment, Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Nsabimana, Nteziryayo, Kanyabashi, Ndayambaje (ICTR-98-
42-A), Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2015 (Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgment), § 3340.
19 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 677.
20 Ibid.; Judgment, Ngirabatware (MICT-12-29-A), Appeals Chamber, 18 December 2014
(Ngirabatware Appeal Judgment), § 58.
21 Judgment and Sentence, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (ICTR: 99-52-T), Trial Chamber I
(Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment), 3 December 2003.
22 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, §§ 701, 703, 711, 715.
23 Ibid., §§ 701, 711.
24 Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgment, § 3338.
25 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, §§ 678, 720, 766. Some scholars argue that the jurispru-
dence of the ICTR is ambiguous on this point as many trial judgments also refer to the direct
causal link between speeches and subsequent commission of crimes. This possibly reflects the
position taken by the International Law Commission in its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, in which it held that direct and public incitement attracts indi-
vidual criminal liability when an act of incitement ‘in fact occurs’). See R. Wilson, Incitement on
Trial (Cambridge University Press, 2017), at 25, 32 (arguing that the Nahimana et al. Appeal
Judgment did not completely clear up this causation issue), 42–43. See also Report of the
International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/C/CN.4/L.532, 17 July 1996, available online at http://legal.un.
org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf (visited 17 March 2020), §§ 18,
22. The author is inclined to consider the Appeals Chamber’s views as a mere factual assess-
ment, i.e. that genocide followed the incitement in the Rwanda case, rather than a reflection of
an actual legal standard.
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3. The Early Jurisprudence on Hate Speech
Any inquiry into hate speech should commence with the IMT media cases
against Julius Streicher, editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic newspaper, Der
Stürmer, and Hans Fritzsche, Head of the Radio Division Nazi’s Germany’s
Ministry of Propaganda. In 1946, the IMT convicted Streicher of persecution
based on his publications from 1938 through 1945,26 while it acquitted
Fritzsche because, though his speeches showed anti-Semitism, they did not
urge persecution or extermination of Jews.27
Some scholars argue that the two findings by the IMT support opposing
views: on the one hand, that criminal prosecution can target a wide range
of speeches amounting to persecution while, on the other hand, that such
charges should only be directed at a narrow and extremely serious category
of hate speech which amounts to direct calls to violence.28 One line of inter-
pretation goes even further and holds that Streicher was only convicted on the
basis of unambiguous calls for extermination of Jews — a call to commit
violent crimes — and not because of his earlier pre-World War II
publications.29
Forty years later, the ICTR was faced with the same issues when it was
dealing with hate speech as persecution, a crime against humanity in,
amongst others, the famous Media case against Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze (Nahimana et al.). Nahimana and
Barayagwiza were found guilty of persecution on the basis of the fact that
they had been, inter alia, advocating ethnic hatred or inciting violence against
the Tutsi population for RTLM radio broadcasts in 1994; Ngeze was convicted
in part for the same crime in relation to the content of Kangura newspaper
publications, of which he was editor-in-chief.30
The Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment reversed those convictions for perse-
cution based on hate speech without a call to violence against the Tutsis, while
upholding those based on hate speech that was accompanied by direct calls to
violence against Tutsis.31 It held that ‘hate speeches and calls for violence’,
26 See Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 1 (IMT,
Nuremberg, 1947), Julius Streicher (Streicher Finding), 302–304.
27 Ibid., Hans Fritzsche (Fritzsche Finding), 336–338. See also Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XIV (Nuremberg: October
1946–April 1949), US v. Ernst Weizsacher et al. (Ministries Case), Case 11, Otto Dietrich (Dietrich
Finding), 565–576.
28 Orentlicher, supra note 17, at 582–585; Wilson and Gillett, supra note 6, at 122–123.
29 Orentlicher, supra note 17, at 585–586; M. Kearney, The Prohibition of Propaganda for War in
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), at 40 and note 120.
30 Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment, §§ 7, 1081–1082, 1084.
31 See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, §§ 988, 993, 995–997, 1001–1002, 1013–1014, 1016;
Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment, §§ 1073, 1078–1079, 1081–1084. The Ruggiu Trial Judgment
had also considered incitement amounting to advocacy of ethnic hatred short of violence as
persecution. The judgment was however not appealed so it is unsure if an appeals chamber
would have upheld these findings. See Ruggiu Trial Judgment, § 44(v)–(xii). Cf. Judgment,
Kordić and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2-T), Trial Chamber, 26 February 2001, § 209 and note 272.
ICTR and ICTY trial judgments are not binding upon each other. Judgment, Karemera and






/jicj/article-abstract/18/1/31/5858150 by guest on 24 June 2020
considered as a whole and in the context of a widespread campaign of perse-
cution against the Tutsis, constituted acts of persecution.32 Being crimes
against humanity, such acts of persecution would have been committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population. Thus,
the holding in the Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment that there need not be a ‘call
to action in communications that constitutes persecution’ nor a ‘link between
persecution and acts of violence’ was reversed on appeal.33 Yet, the Appeal
Chamber did not explicitly state which was the determinative factor for its
finding of persecution: the hate speech, as part of a widespread and systematic
attack against the Tutsi population, or the calls to violent acts, which in this
case involved calls to commit crimes against the person, including murder,
torture, ill-treatment and rape.34
These early cases on hate speech do not therefore fully answer the question
of whether hate speech short of calls to violence may be sufficient for a finding
of persecution as a crime against humanity. From this case-law, it is also not
clear if violence has to actually ensue and be caused by such calls to violence
— though of course, factually, violence in the form of murder, deportation,
torture, ill-treatment, and rapes did take place during and after Streicher’s and
Nahimana’s respective writings or speeches.35
Due to this lack of clarity, divergent viewpoints continue to plague the
commentaries on the jurisprudence on hate speech. This is also why the
Appeals Chamber’s judgment in the Šešelj case raised so many expectations,
and why it likely disappointed so many when it was issued, since it still did not
fully address the point of whether incitement to discrimination or hatred, short
of calls to violence alone can amount to persecution, and if so, in which
circumstances. To put the analysis in perspective, a short review of the case
against Šešelj is in order.
4. The Case against Vojislav Šešelj — an Overview
Vojislav Šešelj, a nationalist politician, President of the Serbian Radical Party
and member of the Serbian Parliament, was charged by the ICTY Office of the
Prosecutor, inter alia, with having instigated and committed crimes against
humanity and war crimes, including deportation and persecution, during the
conflicts that ravaged the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dur-
ing the 1990s.36 The prosecution specifically charged Šešelj with persecution
as a crime against humanity by direct and public denigration through hate
Ngirumpatse (ICTR-98-44A), Appeals Chamber, 29 September 2014, § 52; Judgment, Lukić and
Lukić (IT-98-32/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 4 December 2012 § 260.
32 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 988 (emphasis added).
33 Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment, § 1073.
34 See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, §§ 987-988.
35 See Streicher Finding, 302-304; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 988; Ruggiu Trial
Judgment, § 44 (viii)-(ix), (xi).
36 Indictment, §§ 2–5, 10(b)(c)(d), 15–17, 31–33.
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speech against the non-Serb population of Vukovar in Croatia, Zvornik in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Hrtkovci in Vojvodina, Serbia.37 The prosecution
further alleged that Šešelj recruited and organized Serb volunteer units, known
as ‘Šešeljevci’, who committed crimes against non-Serb civilians.38
The case against Šešelj was that he had instigated the direct perpetrators of
the alleged crimes by, inter alia, using inflammatory and denigrating propa-
ganda against non-Serbs in his speeches and publications.39 It further held
that Šešelj was aware of the power of his propaganda and his influence with
Serb volunteers, in particular the Šešeljevci.40 Šešelj, who represented himself,
claimed that his speeches were intended to galvanize Serb troops and to ar-
ticulate his own political vision.41 He acknowledged that he advocated his
ideology, but claimed that this did not amount to persecution.42 The Trial
Chamber in Šešelj, by majority, acquitted Šešelj of all charges even though it
found that three of his speeches — one given in Hrtkovici (Vojvodina, Serbia)
on 6 May 1992 and two to the Serbian Parliament on 1 and 7 April 1992 —
were calls for the expulsion and forcible transfer of Croats.43
On appeal, the prosecution averred that the Trial Chamber had erred in not
finding Šešelj responsible for crimes on the basis of his speeches.44 It submitted
in this regard that the Trial Chamber had failed to engage with its core argu-
ment that his ‘relentless propaganda campaign’ instigated the commission of
crimes against non-Serbs.45 In the end, the Appeals Chamber reversed certain
acquittals by the Trial Chamber, and entered convictions for instigating perse-
cution (forcible displacement), deportation, and other inhumane acts (forcible
transfer) as crimes against humanity and for committing persecution (violation
of the right to security) as a crime against humanity in Hrtkovci, Vojvodina.46
With this in mind, a brief overview of one of Šešelj’s speeches, the Hrtkovici
speech, which was the basis of his convictions on appeal, is called for. This is
followed below by a discussion on various issues arising out of both the Šešelj
Trial Judgment and Šešelj Appeal Judgment.
37 Ibid., §§ 17(k), 20, 22, 33.
38 Ibid., §§ 10(a), (g),16, 20–22, 24, 26–27, 29, 32–33.
39 Šešelj Trial Judgment, §§ 286–287.
40 Ibid., § 288.
41 Ibid., §§ 9, 11, 289, 291, 329.
42 Ibid., §§ 291, 297.
43 Ibid., §§. 333, 338, 343 and pp. 109–110. The Trial Chamber further found that war crimes
had been committed by Serb forces including the Šešeljevci but that there was no hierarchical
link between Šešelj and his volunteers once they were integrated with Serb forces (Ibid., §§
116, 205–220, 249), and that there had been no JCE involving him (Ibid., § 281. See also ibid.,
§§ 220-280).
44 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 120.
45 Ibid., § 123.
46 Ibid., §§ 155, 165-166, 181.
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5. Hate Speech as Persecution — the Hrtkovci Speech
On 6 May 1992, Šešelj spoke in the village of Hrtkovci in Vojvodina, Serbia
and claimed ‘there was no room for Croats in Hrtkovci . . . that the Croats who
had not yet left of their own accord would be escorted to the border by bus; . . .
that he firmly believed that the Serbs from Hrtkovci and the surrounding
villages . . . would promptly get rid of the remaining Croats in [their] village
and the surrounding villages.’47 The crowd then chanted ‘Ustashas out’,
‘Croats, go to Croatia’ and ‘This is Serbia’.48
The Trial Chamber found by majority that the speech given by Šešelj clearly
constituted a call for the expulsion of Croats from the village.49 However, it
deemed, by a different majority, that the prosecution had failed to prove that
this speech was the reason for the departure of the Croats or for the campaign
of persecution carried out in the village following the speech.50
The Appeals Chamber, recalling the Trial Chamber’s own finding that this
speech constituted a ‘clear appeal’ for the expulsion of Croats in Hrtkovci,
instead held that no reasonable trier of fact could have found that it did not
‘incite violence that denigrated and violated the right to security of members of
the Croatian population’.51 According to the Appeals Chamber, Šešelj’s speech
was grave enough to amount to persecution as a crime against humanity.52
With his speech, Šešelj ended the ‘relative peace in Hrtkovci’ and the ‘sense of
safety by infecting the village with hatred and violence’ and led to the depart-
ure of Croats in the ensuing months.53 It held that Šešelj’s speech denigrated
Croats on the basis of their ethnicity, in violation of their right to respect for
dignity as human beings.54 The Appeals Chamber thus found Šešelj had com-
mitted persecution, a crime against humanity, based on a violation of the right
to security.55
A. Terminology Used
Looking first at the prosecution’s framing of the charge of persecution, the
‘direct and public denigration’ of non-Serbs echoes the terminology of the
crime of direct and public incitement to genocide. This epitomizes the way
47 Ibid., § 331.
48 Ibid., § 332.
49 Ibid., § 333.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., §§ 161, 163.
52 Ibid., § 163. The Appeals Chamber was satisfied that Šešelj’s speech amounted to discrimination
in fact and that it was delivered with discriminatory intent, that his conduct formed part of the
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population encompassing also parts of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that he was aware that such conduct formed part
of the attack. Ibid., § 164.
53 Ibid., § 163.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., §§ 165–166.
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the jurisprudence on incitement to genocide has shaped prosecutorial strategy
and influenced the discourse on hate speech in judicial settings.
The Trial Chamber noted that there was no proof that the speech was the
reason for the Croats’ departure from Hrtkovci and the persecutory campaign
against them, but did not explain why such proof would have been required.56
It did not lay down the law on persecution and on hate speech as the actus
reus of such crime, so we are left guessing why it reached its conclusions.
Clarity on appeal was, therefore, even more necessary. The Appeals Chamber
restated that persecution as a crime against humanity under Article 5(h) of the
ICTY Statute was an act or omission which
discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in
international customary or treaty law (actus reus); and (ii) was carried out deliberately with
the intention to discriminate on one of the listed grounds, specifically race, religion, or
politics (mens rea).57
Unlike the crime of direct and public incitement to genocide, the crime of
denigrating hate speech as persecution requires that the persecution in fact
takes place against the targeted person or group in violation of a fundamental
right — that there be discrimination in fact. For this reason, it was important
for the prosecution to prove the impact of the speech. For ease of discussion,
the remainder of this section will follow the elements of persecution set forth
above.
B. Actus reus of Persecution: Hate Speech as Incitement, including the
Language of the Speaker, the Targeted Audience, and the Influence over such
Audience
At the outset, it should be noted that the terminology and methodology used
by the Appeals Chamber in the Šešelj case is at times less than ideal. The
Appeals Chamber first recalled that the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Nahimana
et al. had held that ‘speech inciting to violence against a population on the
basis of ethnicity, or any other discriminatory ground, violates the right to
security of the members of the targeted group and therefore constitutes ‘‘ac-
tual discrimination’’’, and that the context is important.58 It went on to
establish that Šešelj, by ‘instigating the forcible expulsion of Croatians from
Hrtkovici’, ‘incited violence against them, in violation of their right to secur-
ity’, adding that he had also denigrated the Croatians of Hrtkovci on the
basis of their ethnicity, in violation of their right to respect for dignity as
human beings.59 The Appeals Chamber here relied on its previous factual
finding on instigation of forcible displacement and forcible transfer (amount-
ing to persecution) to make a finding on commission of persecution,
56 See supra text before note 50.
57 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 159 (internal references omitted).
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., § 163 and note 578 (referring to Šešelj Appeal Judgment, §§154–155).
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considering the violations of fundamental human rights it entailed (right to
security).60 Put differently, in this case the factual findings made to find
instigation were used as the ‘vehicle’ for the finding of commission of
persecution.
Recalling the Trial Chamber’s own finding that Šešelj’s speech was a ‘clear
appeal’ for the expulsion of Croats from Hrtkovci, the language used by šešelj
— ‘there is no room for Croats in Hrtkovci’,61 his direct address to the Croats,
the targeted persons — ‘no, you have nowhere to return to’,62 his influence
over the Serb crowd and the similarities between his words and the acts
(‘repeated mistreatment, threats, and violence resulting in a large percentage
of them leaving Hrtkovic’) that subsequently took place, the Appeals Chamber
found that this speech amounted to incitement as the actus reus of persecu-
tion.63 However, it did not explicitly define ‘incitement’. More specifically: is
incitement a call to violent action or to crime?
The Appeals Chamber’s description of what it considers incitement, as
actus reus of the crime of persecution, is rooted in contextual factors.64
This has in turn led some scholars to argue that hate speech occurring in
the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population
can constitute persecution if it violates a fundamental right and if, considered
‘cumulatively’ with other persecutory acts, it meets the gravity threshold
required for persecution.65 This is so, in their opinion, even if the words in
question do not call explicitly for violence.66 In any case, they also point out
that the Appeals Chamber emphasized the fact that Šešelj ‘incited violence
(particularly in the form of expulsion of the Croatian population in
Hrtkovci)’.67 Other scholars however suggest that, in this case, there were
actually no explicit calls to violence and ‘no need for an immediate context of
violence and crimes’.68
60 See infra discussion in 6. Instigating Crimes through Hate Speech.
61 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 161.
62 Ibid., § 163.
63 Ibid., §§ 162, 164. See also ibid., § 154.
64 The Appeals Chamber had also not defined it in the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment. See
Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 987.
65 See Wilson and Gillett, supra note 6, at 144. See also Judgment, Bikindi (ICTR-01-72-T), Trial
Chamber III, 2 December 2008 (Bikindi Trial Judgment), § 394 (arguing that the same facts
that could lead a trial chamber to find the existence of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population may also support a finding of other underlying acts of persecution
as both have to meet the ‘discriminatory grounds’ threshold). Cf. Nahimana et al. Appeal
Judgment, §§ 987–988; Art. 7(1)(h) ICCSt. Under the ICCSt., persecution as a crime against
humanity must be directed against ‘any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender’ or ‘other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law.’ Unlike the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, however,
this is generally understood to mean that persecution must occur in connection with another
crime listed in Art. 7 of the ICC Statute. See Wilson and Gillett, supra note 6, at 119.
66 Wilson and Gillett, supra note 6, at 144.
67 Ibid., at 138.
68 Timmermann, supra note 6, at 115–116.
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A plain reading of the Šešelj Appeal Judgment confirms that the Appeals
Chamber considered incitement to commit crimes, which could also reason-
ably be expected to involve or lead to violence, as an act of inciting vio-
lence.69 It held that ‘no reasonable trier of fact could have found that Šešelj’s
speech did not incite violence’ and repeated that he had in fact ‘incited vio-
lence’.70 The Appeals Chamber clearly equates incitement to violence with
incitement to commit crimes, and more specifically, forcible transfer and
deportation. There is no indication in the Šešelj Appeal Judgment that the
appellate judges considered the related issues of whether ‘incitement to vio-
lence’ could be broader than inciting crimes. This therefore remains an
unsettled issue.
It should also be noted that, in addition, the Appeals Chamber did not
address the possibility that Šešelj, by inciting forcible transfer and deportation
on the basis of ethnicity, was inciting discrimination. Incitement to discrimin-
ation has been described as ‘beseeching listeners or readers to oppress the
victim group in certain non-violent ways.’71 Thus, it remains unclear from
this judgment and the prior jurisprudence, whether a case of incitement to
violence, absent any incitement to commit a crime, or incitement to discrim-
ination only (without other accompanying discriminatory acts) could amount
to persecution under certain circumstances.
A sideways glance at human rights law is informative on this point.
Incitement has been defined as statements about national, racial, or religious
groups creating an imminent risk of discrimination, hostility or violence
against persons belonging to them — where imminence is related to direct-
ness.72 With regard to racist hate speech, incitement has been defined as
influencing others to engage in certain forms of conduct, including the com-
mission of crimes, through advocacy or threats.73 Advocacy is generally
understood to be ‘explicit, intentional, public and active support and
69 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 163.
70 Ibid. (emphasis added).
71 Gordon, at 313. Discrimination has been described as ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction
made on the basis of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, nationality, gender, sexual
orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, age, economic position, property,
marital status, disability, or any other status that has the effect or purpose of impairing or
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field of
public life.’ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom
of opinion and expression (SR Report), UN Doc. A/67/357, 7 September 2012, § 44 (d). See also
ECRI Recommendation No. 15, § 7 (h).
72 See SR Report, § 44 (c); ECRI Recommendation No. 15, § 7 (q). See also Rabat Plan of Action on
the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
crimination, hostility or violence, Conclusions and recommendations emanating from the four regional
expert workshops organised by OHCHR, in 2011, and adopted by experts in Rabat, Morocco on 5
October 2012 (Rabat Plan of Action), UN Doc. A/HRC/22/17 Add. 4, 11 January 2013, § 22
(likelihood, including imminence, implies that there should be some causation which is ‘rather
direct’).
73 See CERD Recommendation No. 35, § 16; 16/18 Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and
stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on
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promotion of hatred’ towards a target group.74 Meanwhile, violence is ‘the use
of physical force or power against another person, or against a group or com-
munity, which either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury,
death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation’.75
While there are elements of convergence between some aspects of internation-
al human rights and international criminal law, such as the inclusion of incite-
ment to commit crimes as an act of incitement and the concepts of ‘imminence’
and ‘publicity’, human rights law does not provide clear guidance as to whether
incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence should be criminalized or
otherwise sanctioned.76 The only emerging consensus among states seems to
be, vis-à-vis the most extreme forms of incitement to violence, that of criminal-
izing incitement to imminent violence, and then only on the ground of religion
or belief.77 In light of this, the author is of the view that the only correct legal
conclusion is that international criminal jurisprudence, similar to the consensus
emerging in human rights law, may only be interpreted as criminalizing forms of
incitement to violence, which are incitement to commit crimes where ensuing
violence occurs. It does not criminalize incitement to ‘simple’ discrimination,
hatred, or hostility when there is no incitement to actual violence.
In short, the Appeals Chamber in the Šešelj case chose to pursue, as the
ICTY and ICTR had often done in the past, a factual, case-by-case assessment
of whether the conduct in question constituted incitement, rather than laying
down a general definition in abstracto. This may be judicially expedient, of
course, but it does make identifying the legal standard of what constitutes
incitement amounting to persecution somewhat harder, thus leaving more
room to conflicting interpretations.
religion or belief (HRC 16/18 Resolution), Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, A/
HRC/RES/16/18, 12 April 2011 § 5(e)–(f).
74 See SR Report, § 44(b). See also ECRI Recommendation No. 15, § 7 (a).
75 See SR Report, § 44(f). See also ECRI Recommendation No. 15, § 7 (ff).
76 See Reservations to UN treaties available online at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_no¼IV-4&chapter¼4&clang¼_en (visited 17 March 2020); https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼IND&mtdsg_no¼IV-2&chapter¼4&clang¼_en (vis-
ited 17 March 2020). There are no states objecting to the reservations made by the reserving
states. See also CERD Recommendation No. 35, § 12 (referring to General Comment No. 34,
Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, §§
22–35, 33–35)-13. Cf. CERD had earlier taken a strict interpretation on the mental element
required to support criminal liability for incitement. Positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, racial discrimination: implementation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 4, UN Doc. A/CONF.119/10, 1986, §§
83, 96, 235.
77 See e.g. HRC 16/18 Resolution, §5(f) (adopted without a vote). See also Rabat Plan of Action,
at 4–7 (Recommendations).
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C. Actus reus of Persecution: Causality or Impact of Speech and
Discrimination in Fact
The Appeals Chamber also noted that following Šešelj’s speech, Croats were
increasingly harassed, threatened and became victims of violence, which led to
a large number of them leaving Hrtkovci.78 The Appeals Chamber’s reasoning
is actually consistently peppered with references to violence against the Croats
following Šešelj’s speech. For instance, in both its discussions on commission of
persecution and instigation, the climate of ‘repeated mistreatment, threats and
violence’,79 Šešelj’s ‘infecting the village with hatred and violence’,80 and ‘the
context of coercion, harassment, and intimidation, which was met with in-
action by the local authorities’81 are regularly referred to. It seems that, equal-
ly important to the language used by Šešelj, are the resulting crimes and
violent acts committed against the Croats.
The Appeals Chamber’s discussion of incitement and the impact of such
incitement (i.e. the threats and violence which indeed followed it) were inter-
twined to such an extent that the impact can be described as featuring as a
decisive factor for the finding of persecution. Indeed, the impact of the incite-
ment is usually relevant in the context of persecution to show that discrimin-
ation in fact occurred — it is a legal requirement, as mentioned above.82
Ideally, therefore, it should have been dealt with separately, as a discrete legal
element of the crime of persecution, not as part of the finding of the incitement
discussion. In this case, however, the Appeals Chamber’s finding of what con-
stituted the actus reus of incitement for persecution was also riddled with
references to the violence which followed Šešelj’s speech. The centrality given
to the impact of the speech (i.e., the ensuing threats and violence) cannot be
underestimated. This may explain why Presiding Judge Meron, who had par-
tially dissented on hate speech as persecution in the Nahimana et al. Appeal
Judgment, agreed to this finding.83
Thus, although some commentators argue that a link between the speeches
and the subsequent acts that constitute persecution as a crime against hu-
manity is not required, and that it is not necessary for a particular result to be
proven as a direct consequence of the speech, the Šešelj Appeal Judgment, read
as a whole, offers scant support for this viewpoint.84 For a finding of
78 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 164 and note 580 (referring to ibid., §§149–150). See also ibid., §
154
79 Ibid., § 164.
80 Ibid., § 163. This is a term borrowed from the Streicher Finding and Ruggiu Trial Judgment. See
Streicher Finding, 302; Judgment and Sentence, Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32-I), Trial Chamber 1, 1
June 2000 (Ruggiu Trial Judgment), § 19.
81 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 154.
82 See supra text before note 57.
83 Cf. Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 988; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, Partly Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Meron, §§ 3–4, 12–13.
84 See Timmermann, supra note 7, at 144 and note 93 (commenting on Nahimana et al. Trial
Judgment, § 1073 and the Šešelj Trial Judgment); See also Wilson and Gillett, supra note 6, at
144.
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persecution, the Šešelj Appeal Judgment — which is the most recent in the
developing line of jurisprudence of ICTR, ICTY and IRMCT — does actually
require incitement to violence being inciting crimes and violent acts that occur
as a consequence of such incitement.
D. Actus reus of Persecution: In Violation of a Fundamental Right
As briefly mentioned above, the Šešelj Appeal Judgment goes on to hold that
Šešelj’s speech denigrated the Croats on the basis of their ethnicity, in violation
of their ‘right to respect for dignity as human beings’.85 It further endorsed the
ICTR Appeals Judgment in the Nahimana et al. case that ‘speech inciting to
violence against a population on the basis of ethnicity, or any other discrim-
inatory ground, violates the right to security of the members of the targeted
group and therefore constitutes ‘‘actual discrimination’’’.86
The use of the term ‘respect for dignity’ can be traced back to the Nahimana
et al. Appeal Judgment.87 Some have argued that it is unclear how Šešelj’s
words were degrading or dehumanizing88 and that ‘respect for dignity as
human beings’ is not a right in and of itself.89 However, reading this part of
the Šešelj Appeal Judgment in context, it is the right to security of the Croats
and other non-Serbs that is effectively violated by the persecution.90 It would
indeed have been preferable had the Appeals Chamber not used this termin-
ology, ‘their right to respect for dignity as human beings’, but instead referred
to their right of equality and freedom from discrimination — a cornerstone of
the human rights system91 — which is what it was in fact arguably referring
to, in context. In any event, it seems relevant that the Appeals Chamber only
finds that Šešelj’s words reach the requisite level of gravity amounting to the
actus reus of persecution as a crime against humanity only after considering
both aspects (violation of the right to security and violation of the right to
human dignity/freedom from discrimination).
85 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 163.
86 Ibid., § 159
87 See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, §§ 986–987.
88 See Timmermann, supra note 6, at 116–118.
89 Wilson and Gillett, supra note 6, § 140 and note 157. The opposite view is also prevalent. Some
states consider that the right to dignity should be respected and protected in and of itself. See
e.g. Constitution of South Africa, Art. 10 available online at https://www.gov.za/documents/
constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#10 (visited 17 March 2020); Basic Law of Germany, Art.
1(1) available online at https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-
470510 (visited 17 March 2020). See also generally D. Kretzmer and E. Klein, The Concept
of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse (Brill, 2002).
90 See also Šešelj Appeal Judgment, §§ 165–166.
91 See e.g. General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression (CCPR Comment
No. 34), UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, § 2; HRC 16/18 Resolution, § 1.
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E. Mens rea of Persecution
The mens rea of persecution is the ‘specific intent to cause injury to a human
being because he belongs to a particular community or group’.92 This specific
intent must be proven over and above the general intent to commit the crime
of persecution.93 The Appeals Chamber has held that, while the requisite dis-
criminatory intent may not be inferred directly from the general discriminatory
nature of an attack characterized as a crime against humanity, the ‘discrim-
inatory intent may be inferred from such a context as long as, in view of the
facts of the case, circumstances surrounding the commission of the alleged acts
substantiate the existence of such intent’.94
In the case of Hrtkovci, based on the same facts from which it concluded
that there was incitement amounting to persecution, and in line with its jur-
isprudence, the Appeals Chamber also inferred Šešelj’s discriminatory intent.95
It was thus able to exclude inferences that the speech was given as propa-
ganda, in support of the war effort, or to strengthen the morale of the Serb
troops (as Šešelj had invariably argued throughout the proceedings).96 A more
detailed explanation of why it excluded these other inferences (which, in the
minds of the appellate judges, would have had to be unreasonable given the
circumstances) would have helped shed some light on how triers of fact ought
to weigh evidence and would have provided insight into the legal standard
applicable with regard to the mens rea of persecution carried out through hate
speech.
6. Instigating Crimes through Hate Speech
The Šešelj Appeals Chamber also addressed how hate speech may constitute
instigation, not as a crime but rather a mode of liability. In the case of insti-
gation, the accused may be convicted if the instigation to a crime under the
jurisdiction of the court or tribunal was a factor substantially contributing to
the conduct of another person committing a crime.97 After an overview of the
relevant speeches, this section will discuss them in the light of the elements of
instigation as a mode of liability, that is, prompting another to commit a crime,
and the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed
in the execution of that instigation.98
92 Judgment, Kordić and Čerkež (IT-95-14/2-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004 (Kordić &
Čerkež Appeal Judgment), § 111.
93 Ibid., § 111.
94 Judgment, Šainović, Pavković, Lazarević, Lukić (IT-05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January
2014, § 579.
95 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 164.
96 See supra text before notes 41 and 42.
97 Kordić & Čerkež Appeal Judgment § 27. See Šešelj Trial Judgment, §§ 294-296; Šešelj Appeal
Judgment, § 124.
98 See infra discussions at 6.B. Actus reus of Instigation: Direct Causal Connection – 6.E. Mens rea of
Instigation
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A. Overview of Relevant Speeches
With regard to the speech in Hrtkovci, the Appeals Chamber found that
Šešelj had instigated deportation, persecution (forcible displacement) and
other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) as crimes against humanity against
non-Serbs.99 In this context, the Appeals Chamber noted that Šešelj had
influence over the members of his political party, that he was even seen
by some ‘as if he were a god’, and that his speeches had a significant impact
on the audience.100 The Appeals Chamber further noted that, after Šešelj’s
speech, many Croats left for Croatia either out of fear, or by fraudulent
housing exchanges with Serb refugees amid an atmosphere of coercion, har-
assment, and intimidation which was met by inaction on the part of law-
enforcement and other officials.101 In fact, the Appeals Chamber explained,
Serbs, including the then Hrtkovci mayor himself, who had listened to
Šešelj’s speech, regularly threatened non-Serbs who remained in the
town.102 The Appeals Chamber thus considered that in the light of Šešelj’s
influence over the crowd, the striking parallels between his words and the
acts subsequently perpetrated by others including, inter alia, members of his
audience, no reasonable trier of fact could have found that he had not sub-
stantially contributed to the conduct of the perpetrators.103
Other speeches considered in the context of instigation were the ones given
by Šešelj in the Serb Parliament. In the speech of 1 April 1992, Šešelj had
stated: ‘[w]e are going to expel the Croats . . . We are simply going to pack you
into trucks and trains and let you manage in Zagreb.’104 In his second relevant
speech, on 7 April 1992, he stated: ‘[P]erhaps the best solution . . . would be
simply putting [Croats] . . . on buses and trucks and taking them to Zagreb.’105
The Trial Chamber found that the Serb Parliament speeches clearly consti-
tuted calls for the expulsion and forcible transfer of Croats; by another major-
ity, the Trial Chamber however reached the conclusion that they were an
‘expression of an alternative political programme that was never imple-
mented’.106 It also held that, given the lack of measurable impact and the
harsh criticism Šešelj had received for his speeches, it could not find that they
amounted to incitement to war crimes.107 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber
found that the prosecution had not shown a causal link between Šešelj’s
speeches to the Serb Parliament on 1 and 7 April 1992 and the crimes
committed in April 1992 in Mostar, Zvornik, and Greater Sarajevo, or that
the crimes committed between May 1992 and September 1993 could be
99 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 150, 154–155.
100 Ibid., § 147, referring to Šešelj Trial Judgment, § 341. See also Dissenting Opinion, § 12.
101 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, §§ 150, 154.
102 Ibid., § 154.
103 Ibid.
104 Šešelj Trial Judgment, § 336.
105 Ibid., § 337.
106 Ibid., §§ 335, 338.
107 Ibid., §§ 338–339.
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attributed to him.108 The Trial Chamber therefore found Šešelj not guilty of
instigating such crimes.109
The Appeals Chamber left this finding unchanged because, in its view, the
prosecution had not demonstrated at trial the extent of the dissemination of
Šešelj’s speeches and the specific impact they had had on the commission of
crimes in Mostar, Zvornik, and Greater Sarajevo.110 The Appeals Chamber also
found that the temporal link between the speeches and the subsequent crimes
was tenuous.111
In March 1992, Šešelj had further given a speech in Mali Zvornik in which he
had called on his Serb ‘brother Chetniks, especially you across the Drina’ . . . to
clear up Bosnia from the pagans and show them the road to the east where they
belong’.112 Šešelj himself confirmed that he had ‘attacked fundamentalist
Muslims and pan-Islamists who wanted Bosnia to separate from Yugoslavia,
and called them ‘‘pogani’’’, (which according to him meant ‘waste’ or ‘faeces’)
and ‘balijas’ (a derogatory term for Muslims).113 The Trial Chamber, by majority,
did not find that, by calling on the Serbs to ‘clear up’ Bosnia of the ‘pogani’ and
the ‘balijas’, Šešelj was calling for the ethnic cleansing of the non-Serbs of
Bosnia.114 The Trial Chamber found that, given the context, this could have
been a call by Šešelj to galvanize the Serbs in support of the war effort.115 Again,
the Trial Chamber noted that there was no proof of the impact of this speech.116
With regard to this speech, the Appeals Chamber instead considered that
(based on the political context of a possible declaration of independence by
Bosnia and on evidence before the Trial Chamber) no reasonable trial chamber
could have found that Šešelj’s speech did not call for ethnic cleansing.117 It held
that the inflammatory language of Šešelj’s speech could have prompted other
persons to commit crimes against non-Serb civilians.118 The Appeals Chamber
further assessed whether the Trial Chamber’s finding that the speech (as well as
other statements made by Šešelj) ‘had an impact on’, or ‘causal link’ to the
commission of crimes against non-Serbs.119 It then however went on to find
108 Ibid., § 343.
109 Ibid., § 350.
110 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 132. The Appeals Chamber however found that Šešelj had the mens
rea for persecution including discriminatory intent. Ibid., §§ 150, 155 The Appeals Chamber
reversed the Trial Chamber’s finding that there was no widespread or systematic attack
against the civilian population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ibid., §§ 71, 76–78.
Moreover, given the content of Šešelj’ s speech and the contemporaneous events in Croatia
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Appeals Chamber found that the perpetrators were also
aware that their acts formed part of the attack. Ibid., § 150.
111 Ibid. See infra discussion on 6.C. Causal Connection: Temporal.
112 Šešelj Trial Judgment, §§ 324, 327. See also ibid., §§ 321–322, 325–327.
113 Ibid., § 325.
114 Ibid., § 328. The Trial Chamber failed to consider the pejorative connotation of these words in
the Bosnian Serb language.
115 Ibid., § 328.
116 Ibid. See infra discussion at 6.C. Causal Connection: Temporal.
117 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 130.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., § 131.
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that, because the prosecution’s argument on appeal was the temporal link be-
tween Šešelj’s speeches and the contemporaneous or subsequent commission of
crimes in various locations, given the time span of ‘nearly 3 weeks’ from the
time of his speech, a reasonable trier of fact could have found such a link
tenuous.120 It therefore upheld the Trial Chamber’s overall finding.121
On 7 November 1991, on his way to Vukovar (Croatia), Šešelj had held a
press conference in the town Šid in Serbia, close to the border with Croatia (at
the time Croatia had declared its independence but had not been recognized as
a separate state), stating that ‘this entire area will soon be cleared of the
Ustashas’.122 Then, on 12 and 13 November 1991, he made several additional
speeches in Vukovar, saying to Serb forces and to the Šešeljevci that ‘no
Ustashas must leave Vukovar alive’ and that they should ‘show [them] no
mercy’.123 Going around the town in a vehicle with a loudspeaker, Šešelj
also allegedly called on Croat soldiers to surrender, and according to some of
the evidence, he told the ‘Ustashas’ that if they did not, they would die.124
The Trial Chamber found that, with respect to Šešelj’s speeches in November
1991, the content of what he actually said was equivocal — noting that there
was a reasonable possibility that the speeches were rather made to support the
morale of the Serb troops.125
On appeal, the prosecution argued that, as the war in Croatia escalated and
after months of ‘building a reservoir of hate’, Šešelj ‘triggered’ the crimes
committed in Vukovar.126 It referred to evidence that these statements were
understood by the Šešeljevci to mean that Croat detainees should be executed,
as well as to evidence allegedly showing that Šešelj deliberately equated the
broader Croat population with ‘Ustashas’.127 The Appeals Chamber held that
the prosecution had not addressed the Trial Chamber’s main reservation — the
content of Šešelj’s statements and thus left this finding undisturbed.128
B. Actus reus of Instigation: Direct Causal Connection
Turning to the Appeals Chamber’s assessment of instigation, the discussion on
the Hrtkovci speech is the most instructive. Addressing the prosecution’s
120 Ibid., § 132.
121 Ibid. See infra discussion at 6.C. Causal Connection: Temporal.
122 Šešelj Trial Judgment, § 306. The word ‘Ustashas’, from the name of a nationalist Croat
organization active in the 1930s and 1940s, is linked to fascist ideology and practices,
including persecution of Serbs, Jews, Romani and other minorities, as well as to brutal
violence.
123 Ibid., §§ 309–310.
124 Ibid., §§ 310, 318.
125 Ibid., §§ 304–318. See infra discussion at 6.D. Actus reus of Instigation: Content and Purpose of
the Speech.
126 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 136.
127 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 136. See infra discussion at 6.D. Actus reus of Instigation: Content
and Purpose of the Speech.
128 Ibid. § 137. See infra discussion at 6.D. Actus reus of Instigation: Content and Purpose of the
Speech.
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argument that Šešelj’s speech was given to a large audience and was quickly
disseminated, the Appeals Chamber noted that the Hrtkovci speech was given
to ‘some 700 Serb Radical Party sympathizers and citizens[,] 60% of whom
were Serbian refugees from Croatia’.129 While at first glance the size of the
audience and the quick dissemination of Šešelj’s speech may appear to be
irrelevant — they often go to prove the public element of the crime of direct
and public incitement to commit genocide —130 they also show the causal
connection required between the instigation and the crimes committed. Hence,
the Appeals Chamber focused carefully on the presence of some perpetrators of
crimes, including the future mayor of the town himself, in Šešelj’s audience.131
The thread running through this assessment is the direct impact the speech
had on some members of his audience who subsequently went on to commit
crimes, such as forcible transfer.132 This appears to be so despite the fact that
the Appeals Chamber did not explicitly use the term ‘direct’. In this regard, it
appears reasonable to conclude that directness is not required to prove a sub-
stantial contribution to the conduct of the person committing the instigated
crime, although it would probably be easier to meet the burden of proof if there
is proof instigation was indeed direct. One wonders if this is again the lingering
influence of the jurisprudence on direct and public incitement to genocide.133
Regarding the speeches in the Serb Parliament, the Appeals Chamber
recalled that the prosecution had not demonstrated at trial the breadth of their
129 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 147.
130 See supra text before notes 19–20.
131 Ibid., §§ 147, 149, 154.
132 Some ICTR and ICTY trial chambers have indeed held that for instigation, the causal con-
nection must have ‘directly and substantially contributed’ to the subsequent commission of
crimes or must have been a ‘clear contributing factor’. Judgment and Sentence, Ndindabahizi
(ICTR-2001-71-I), Trial Chamber 1, 15 July 2004, § 456; Judgment, Kvočka, Kos, Radić, Žigić,
Prcać (IT-98-30/1-T), Trial Chamber, 2 November 2001, § 252. Cf. Decision Pursuant to Art.
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco
Ntaganda, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-309 09-06-2014 1/98 EC PT), Pre-Trial Chamber
II, 9 June 2014, § 153 (holding that for inducement, there has to be, inter alia, ‘a direct
effect on the commission or attempted commission of the crime’); Judgment pursuant to Art.
74 of the Statute, Bemba Gombo, Kilolo Musamba, Mangenda Kabongo Babala Wandu, Arido
(ICC-01/05-01/13-1989-Red 19-10-2016 1/458 NM T), Trial Chamber VII, 19 October
2016, § 73 (holding that the modes of liability of ‘soliciting and inducing’ in Art. 25(3)(b)
of the ICCSt. ‘fall into the broader category of ‘‘instigating’’’).
133 See e.g. Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, §§ 677, 701, 711; Ngirabatware Appeal Judgment,
§ 58; Nyiramasuhuko et al. Appeal Judgment, § 3338. It is interesting to note Judge Lattanzi’s
Dissenting Opinion on instigation. She referred to the content of the speech, means of dis-
semination and impact, seemingly implying that these are legal requirements for instigation
on the basis of speech. See Dissenting Opinion, §§ 95–123. Rather, impact is likely relevant
only to the extent that it shows the substantial contribution of the instigator on the perpe-
trators of crimes. On the other hand, the means of dissemination of the speech are not directly
related to a legal requirement for instigation: while it is relevant on an evidentiary level, the
emphasis on dissemination of the speech (and its modalities) once again seems to lead back to
the elements for the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, not incitement
as a mode of liability, and thus may lead to judicial confusion. In fact, it is the purpose of the
speech and the context, discussed in Judge Lattanzi’s dissent together with the impact of the
speech, which are more pertinent. See Dissenting Opinion, §§ 117–119.
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dissemination and the ‘specific impact’ that they had had on the commission of
crimes.134 These are both puzzling statements. With regard to the former, this
is hardly a fair comment on the part of the Appeals Chamber because, by its
nature, parliament is a public place, and its impact is, by definition, public. In
fact, parliament is so obviously a public place that the prosecution would have
met the ‘publicity’ threshold, if this were legally required. But instigation does
not require publicity, according to previous statements of the law by ICTY and
ICTR. Indeed, wide dissemination of a speech is also not necessary to prove
instigation. Why the Appeals Chamber mentioned this as though it were a
legal requirement remains a mystery.
As to the ‘specific impact’ comment, it is unclear what this means as well.
There is no legal explicit requirement amounting to ‘specific impact’ for a
finding of instigation: there need only be a substantial contribution through
this speech of the crimes that ensued. Is this reference to specific impact pos-
sibly related to a temporal link?135 In the context of instigation, the ‘causal
connection’136 between the instigation and the actus reus of the crime is ne-
cessary to show the instigation was substantial; maybe the Appeals Chamber
was trying to detail what is needed, especially in the context of ‘political’
speeches, for the link (i.e. the contribution) between the words of the instigator
and the crimes committed by others, to be substantial enough. The Appeals
Chamber’s use of the term ‘specific’, possibly meaning direct, unfortunately
causes more confusion in an area where jurisprudence is scant.
C. Causal Connection: Temporal
As to the Mali Zvornik and the Serb Parliament speeches, the Appeals
Chamber found that the time elapsed between them and the subsequent crimes
could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclusions other than a finding of
causality, although this argument is definitively under-developed.137 For in-
stance, the time span of ‘nearly 3 weeks’ from the time of Šešelj’s Mali Zvornik
speech and the subsequent crimes committed in Zvornik was considered a
‘tenuous’ link.138 With regard to the speeches in the Serb Parliament, the
Appeals Chamber merely held that, on appeal, the Prosecution had failed to
show that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the impugned
conclusion.139
134 See supra text before note 110.
135 See infra discussion at 6.C. Causal Connection: Temporal.
136 See supra discussion at 6.B. Actus reus of Instigation: Causal Connection.
137 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 132.
138 Ibid. Meanwhile, in its discussion on the Hrtkovci speech, the Appeals Chamber noted that the
Croats left Hrtkovci in the four months after his speech. However, the temporal link was not
the main argument of the prosecution in that case, so the Appeals Chamber did not comment
on it. It also appears not to have been determinative of its finding of persecution. See ibid., §
163.
139 Ibid., § 132. See also supra text before note 111.
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In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment
upheld a finding of instigation following an RTLM broadcast which urged
Tutsis to return to their homes, when many of those who returned were
immediately killed — on the same day of their return and the broadcast.140
The Nahimana et al. Appeals Chamber also left undisturbed a finding of insti-
gation in the killing of three priests who had been named in a RTLM broadcast
of 20 May 1994 and were subsequently killed. One of them, Father Ngoga,
who had earlier managed to escape, was killed 11 days after the broadcast.141
Thus, even when a broadcast did not include a call for the killing of Tutsis, a
direct temporal link was still found between the broadcast and the commission
of the subsequent crimes. In this case, scholars have argued that the context of
the RTLM other broadcasts (and the overall situation in the area) was also
relevant to the finding of instigation.142
Looking at other earlier cases, such as Streicher and Ruggiu, the time elapsed
between the speech or broadcast, on the one hand, and the commission of
crimes for which they were held responsible, on the other, varied between
weeks and months (in the case of Nazi Germany, arguably even years).143
Granted, those cases referred to persecution as a crime against humanity
(and direct and public incitement to genocide) and the temporal link was
considered in the context of discrimination in fact, an aspect of the actus
reus of persecution: these findings were not taking into account the temporal
link as relevant to the causal connection with regard to instigation. However,
when assessing the impact of speech, courts tend to look at a series of events
that culminate in the commission of crime(s), regardless of the rubric under
which the charges are being considered.144 Causation is a tool to gauge the
mental effect a speech had on the perpetrators of the crime(s) in question.145
As such, the test is the same whether the tool is used in the context of
examining the crime of persecution or the mode of liability of instigation.
In light of this, it appears somewhat arbitrary for the Šešelj Appeals Chamber
to implicitly make a finding that, in the context of instigating a crime, a
temporal link of approximately three weeks is tenuous. The Appeals
Chamber appears to be considering that a three-week gap between the speech
and the subsequent (instigated) crimes does not translate into a substantial
contribution as other factors may have also contributed to the crimes in ques-
tion, thus negating the substantial nature of the contribution of the original
speech. Indeed, the longer the time elapsed between the speech and the crimes
that took place, the greater the possibility that other events could have inter-
vened and (at least partially) contributed to the actual commission of such
crimes.146 Moreover, being an appellate review, the Appeals Chamber was only
140 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 515; Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment, §§ 449, 482.
141 Ibid., § 515; Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment, §§ 411, 482.
142 Timmermann, supra note 7, at 149.
143 Streicher Finding, 301–304; Ruggiu Trial Judgment, §§ 24, 43, at 18–19.
144 See Wilson, supra note 25, at 166–168.
145 Ibid.
146 See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, § 513.
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looking at whether a reasonable trier of fact could have reached such findings,
even if maybe some of the appellate judges themselves would have reached a
different conclusion on the same facts. Nonetheless, even if other factors had
intervened to partially contribute to the crimes committed, a trier of fact
should be careful to keep in mind that it is possible to have multiple factors
causing a crime (each contributing), and still find instigation147: what is
required is that the speech was the cause that made a substantial contribution
to the crime, not the sole or essential contribution.
What if the prosecution had been able to prove a link other than the tem-
poral link to show that Šešelj’s speech amounted to a substantial contribution
and therefore instigation? For instance, if it could have shown that some Serb
followers of Šešelj, or the Šešeljevci, over whom he had at least de facto moral
authority, committed some of these subsequent crimes? What if some Šešeljevci
were proven to have been present in the audience when he gave this speech,
as was the case with the Hrtkovci speech? What if evidence could have been
found, from insiders in the Serb groups, of how the speech had prompted them
to commit crimes? In such instances, a trier of fact, applying the law correctly,
would have had to establish instigation, and reach a verdict very different from
the one entered by the Trial Chamber and upheld by the Appeals Chamber.
Understandably, on the evidence discussed by the Trial Chamber, the
Appeals Chamber instead seemed reluctant to assess evidence on the causal
connection itself, since the relationship in those instances of speeches was
somewhat more indirect than what it had in the case of the Hrtkovci speech.
Yet, we would have benefited from a more thorough analysis by the Appeals
Chamber on this point.148
D. Actus reus of Instigation: Content and Purpose of the Speech
It is interesting to note that with regard to the Vukovar speeches, the Appeals
Chamber framed the main issue as being that of the content of the message.
What a speaker actually says is the starting point of any inquiry as to whether
a speech can be considered as criminal. The term ‘Ustasha’ according to Šešelj
himself, referred to fascist Croats who had sided with the Nazis in World War
II, and who had killed Serbs.149 In the 1990s, according to him, this term
meant the Croatian extremists, supported by Franjo Tud-man, then President of
147 See Kordić & Čerkež Appeal Judgment, § 27.
148 This case also highlights the dilemma prosecutors face with causation and why some scholars
argue that at least in the context of public and direct incitement to genocide, ‘reasonable prob-
ability’ or ‘likelihood’ should replace ‘causation’ as a test (see S. Benesch, ‘The Ghost of
Causation in International Speech Crime Cases’, in P. Dojčinović (ed.), Propaganda, War
Crimes Trials and International Law (Routledge, 2012) 254–267, at 256, 262–264; H. van
der Wilt, ‘Between Hate Speech and Mass Murder: How to Recognize Incitement to Genocide’,
in H.G. van der Wilt, J. Vervliet et al. (eds), The Genocide Convention: The Legacy of 60 Years
(Brill, 2012), at 41–50. However, in relation to instigation, causation remains a legal require-
ment so this suggestion is less relevant in this specific context.
149 Šešelj Trial Judgment, § 317. See also ibid., § 14.
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Croatia, who persecuted Serbs.150 The Trial Chamber did not explain the his-
torical and cultural meaning of this word further, nor why it chose to believe
Šešelj’s own explanation of who he was referring to when he used this word.
The Trial Chamber also did not explain why it did not give weight to the
testimony of those who explained what the words meant to them. Such an
approach was clearly inconsistent with that taken in the Nahimana et al. and
Bikindi Trial Judgments, which relied on testimony to decipher the meaning of
historical references made by the speakers, and how these references had
changed over time.151 Such analysis is unfortunately lacking in the Šešelj
Trial Judgment.
A closer look at what the Šešelj Trial Chamber actually held shows that the
emphasis in its analysis was on another issue  the purpose of the speech.
Besides the unclear content of the speech, the Trial Chamber found that:
more decisively, [it][ ]. . .does not deem that the reported speeches, even if we assume they
have been proven, can be considered as acts of instigating a crime. Their context rather
suggests that these were speeches aimed at reinforcing the Accused’s political party.152
Assuming the speech was actually given (something the Trial Chamber
should have probably established beyond the reference to it being ‘reported’),
a reasonable trier of fact should have assigned more weight to it, especially in
the atmosphere of witness intimidation surrounding this trial, together with
the out-of-court statements of recanted witnesses.153 In light of these circum-
stances and if Šešelj had actually uttered the words alleged (including that ‘no
Ustashas must leave Vukovar alive’, that Serbs should ‘show [them] no mercy’,
and the other speeches against Croats), it would have been reasonable for a
trier of fact to reach the conclusion that these speeches had prompted crimes:
at the end of the day, whether a speech has a substantial effect on the
150 Ibid., § 317 & note 371.
151 See e.g. Nahimana et al. Trial Judgment, §§ 394, 456-458, 473, 481, 652-656, 666; Bikindi
Trial Judgment, §§ 247–252. See also Ruggiu Trial Judgment, §§ 44(iii)–(iv).
152 Šešelj Trial Judgment, § 307 (emphasis added).
153 See Dissenting Opinion, § 22. In an extraordinary line of procedural obstructions and con-
tempt proceedings related to the main criminal case against him, Šešelj was inter alia con-
victed for revealing the identities of protected witnesses on several occasions, while persons
closely collaborating with him were convicted for witness intimidation. See e.g. Judgment,
Šešelj (IT-03-67-R77.2), Trial Chamber, 24 July 2009 (public redacted version); Judgment,
Šešelj (IT-03-67-R77.2-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 May 2010; Judgment, Šešelj (IT-03-67-
R77.3), Trial Chamber, 31 October 2011 (public redacted version); Judgment, Šešelj (IT-03-
67-R77.3-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 November 2012; Judgment, Šešelj (IT-03-67-R77.4), Trial
Chamber II, 28 June 2012 (public redacted version); Judgment, Šešelj (IT-03-67-R77.4-A),
Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2013 (public redacted version). See also Judgment, Petković (IT-03-
67-R77.1), Trial Chamber III, 11 September 2008 (public redacted version); Order Lifting
Confidentiality of Order in Lieu of Indictment and Arrest Warrants, Jojić et al. (IT-03-67-
R77.5), Trial Chamber 1, 1 December 2015; Order of Transfer to the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Jojić et al. (IT-03-67-R77.5), President’s Office,
29 November 2017.
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commission of a crime is a fact-based inquiry.154 In any event, and even
considering the role of appellate instances, a more in-depth analysis on the
part of the Appeals Chamber on the content and purpose of the speech given
would still have been useful for further clarity of the law.
E. Mens rea of Instigation
The ICTY Appeals Chamber had previously held that a person who instigates
an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime
will be committed in the execution of that instigation, has the requisite mens
rea for establishing criminal liability.155 This means that an individual who
instigates an act with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that perse-
cution as a crime against humanity will be committed in the execution of such
instigation may be held liable for the crime of persecution.156
The Šešelj Appeal Judgment held that instigation implies ‘prompting another
person to commit an offence’, confirming the above-mentioned standard.
Although proof of a causal connection between the instigation and the actus
reus of the crime is required, the prosecution need not prove that the crime
would not have been perpetrated without the accused’s prompting: in other
words, the contribution does not need to be essential.
Applying this standard, the Šešelj Appeals Chamber found that Šešelj
intended to prompt the commission of crimes or, at the very least, was aware
of the substantial likelihood that they would be committed as a result of his
instigation through his speech of 6 May 1992 in Hrtkovci.157 Again, the mens
rea discussion is factual: the Appeals Chamber explicitly referred to the ‘con-
tent’ of his speech and inferred his mens rea from the ‘inflammatory words’
used.158 This does highlight the importance of the actual words used, which
should in fact be the starting-point of any analysis of hate speech cases.
7. Conclusion
The Šešelj Appeal Judgment was an opportunity to clarify the earlier case-law
on what kind of hate speech can be regarded as criminal. The IRMCT Appeals
Chamber however failed to explicitly and unequivocally address the issue.
Based on a plain reading of the judgment, it is only the more extreme form
of incitement to violence, that is inciting to commit crimes and ensuing violent
acts that constitutes persecution as a crime against humanity, not ‘mere’
154 Cf. Judgment, Popović, Beara, Nikolić, Miletić, Pandurević (IT-05-88-A), Appeals Chamber, 30
January 2015, § 1741 (on aiding and abetting); Judgment, Nzabonimana (ICTR-98-44D-A),
Appeals Chamber, 29 September 2014, § 489 (on aiding and abetting).
155 Kordić & Čerkež Appeal Judgment, § 112; Judgment, Blaškić (IT-95-14-A), Appeals Chamber,
29 July 2004, § 166.
156 Ibid.
157 Šešelj Appeal Judgment, § 154.
158 Ibid.
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incitement to discrimination or hatred. This requirement for incitement to
violence to be incitement to commit crimes with violent acts as a result of
such incitement is not only supported by a holistic reading of the more recent
ad hoc tribunals’ appeals chambers’ jurisprudence, but is also reflective of the
current state of international human rights law, with its emerging consensus
that allows criminalization of hate speech, but only when it amounts to in-
citement to imminent violence.159 International human rights law, as it
stands today, does not extend to the criminalization of other forms of
incitement.160
With regard to the second question this article posed, i.e. whether a causal
nexus is required between incitement to violence — incitement to commit
crimes, and any subsequent acts of violence, the answer is in the affirmative.
Not only is actual discrimination an element of the crime of persecution: in
Šešelj, the actual violent acts that ensued were actually decisive to the finding
of persecution committed through incitement to violence. Because the appel-
late judges did not discuss the lapse of time between the Hrtkovci speech and
the subsequent violent acts, it is hard to ascertain if imminence is also
required, and what this might entail in various factual circumstances.161
Turning to hate speech as a form of instigation of crimes (a mode of liability,
rather than a crime itself), the Šešelj Appeals Chamber’s restatement of the law
was less controversial. The substantial causal connection required for instiga-
tion of a crime must be direct, whether temporal or otherwise — although the
Appeals Chamber did not explicitly use the term ‘direct’, and directness is not a
legal requirement for instigation.
In any event, in the Šešelj case, the difference between, on the one hand,
hate speech as the actus reus of persecution, which requires incitement to
violence, that is, incitement to commit crimes and subsequent acts of violence
and, on the other, instigation, which requires a substantial contribution to the
ensuing crime, remained somewhat blurred. This is in part owing to the reli-
ance by the Appeals Chamber on the same underlying factual findings, which
formed the basis for the prosecution’s arguments on both persecution and
instigation. But it is also because the Appeals Chamber did not clearly define
whether criminal hate speech amounts to the commission of crimes. Defining
hate speech in international criminal law thus continues to be elusive.
159 See supra text before note 77.
160 See supra text before note 76.
161 It is of note that imminence has been identified as an aspect of incitement by the Appeals
Chamber in the context of direct and public incitement to genocide. See supra text before note
24.
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